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Abstract  The  publication  of  the  ﬁfth  edition  of  the  DSM  has  intensiﬁed  a  debate  begun  some
time agowith  the  announcement  of  the  changes  in  diagnostic  criteria  proposed  by  the  APA.  This
article analyzes  some  of  these  modiﬁcations.  Some  interesting  points  where  it  is  right,  such  as
the inclusion  of  dimensionality  in  both  diagnostic  classes  and  in  some  disorders,  the  inclusion  of
an obsessive-compulsive  spectrum,  and  the  disappearance  of  subtypes  of  schizophrenia.  It  also
analyzes other  more  controversial  points,  such  as  the  consideration  of  the  attenuated  psychosis
syndrome,  the  description  of  a  persistent  depressive  disorder,  reorganization  of  the  classic
somatoform  disorders  as  somatic  symptom  disorders,  or  maintenance  of  three  large  clusters  of
personality  disorders,  always  unsatisfactory,  along  with  an  announced,  but  marginal,  suggestion
of the  dimensional  perspective  of  personality  impairments.  The  new  DSM-5  classiﬁcation  opens
many questions  about  the  diagnostic  validity  which  it  attempts  to  improve,  this  time  taking  an
approach nearer  to  neurology  and  genetics  than  to  clinical  psychology.
© 2014  Asociación  Espan˜ola  de  Psicología  Conductual.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  All
rights reserved.
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Del  DSM-IV-TR  al  DSM-5:  análisis  de  algunos  cambios
Resumen  La  publicación  de  la  quinta  edición  del  DSM  ha  avivado  un  debate  iniciado  tiempo
atrás, desde  el  anuncio  de  los  cambios  en  los  criterios  de  diagnóstico  propuestos  por  la  APA.
En este  artículo  se  analizan  algunas  de  estas  modiﬁcaciones.  Se  plantean  aspectos  interesantesEstudio  teórico y acertados,  como  la  inclusión  de  la  dimensionalidad  tanto  en  las  clases  diagnósticas  como  en
algunos trastornos,  la  incorporación  de  un  espectro  obsesivo-compulsivo  o  la  desaparición  de
los subtipos  de  esquizofrenia.  También  se  analizan  otros  aspectos  más  controvertidos  como
la consideración  del  síndrome  de  psicosis  atenuada,  la  descripción  de  un  trastorno  depre-
sivo persistente,  la  reordenación  en  trastornos  de  síntomas  somáticos  los  clásicos  trastornos
somatoformes,  o  el  mantenimiento  de  los  tres  grandes  grupos  de  trastornos  de  la  personalidad,
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siempre  insatisfactorios,  junto  con  un  planteamiento  anunciado,  pero  marginal,  de  la  perspec-
tiva dimensional  de  las  alteraciones  de  la  personalidad.  La  nueva  clasiﬁcación  del  DSM-5  abre
numerosos interrogantes  acerca  de  la  validez  que  se  pretende  mejorar  en  el  diagnóstico,  en
esta ocasión,  asumiendo  un  planteamiento  más  cercano  a  la  neurología  y  la  genética  que  a  la
psicopatología  clínica.
©  2014  Asociación  Espan˜ola  de  Psicología  Conductual.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos
los derechos  reservados.
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nTo  judge  by  the  success  of  its  sales  (Blashﬁeld,  Keeley,
lanagan,  &  Miles,  2014),  the  publication  of  a  new  edition
f  the  DSM  has  immediately  become  an  event.  This  study
s  intended  to  analyze  some  aspects  that  the  ﬁfth  edition
f  the  DSM  (American  Psychiatric  Association  APA,  2013b)
ontributes.  It  is  materially  impossible  to  consider  all  its
ections,  at  the  same  time  that  it  requires  aneducational
ffort  for  its  explanation:  disappearance  of  hypochondria  or
f  concepts  such  as  somatization,  substance  dependence,
ppearance  of  spectra,  new  disorders,  etc.  Therefore,  a
election  has  been  made  of  what  might  be  the  most  out-
tanding  from  a  clinical,  psychopathological  viewpoint.
The  Manual’s  presentation  states  its  intention  of  improv-
ng  the  validity  of  previous  editions  and  of  being  based  on
esearch.  However,  the  sources  to  which  it  alludes  are  from
euroscience  and  genetics.  Although  the  text  considers  psy-
hological  (and  social)  factors,  it  is  not  this  type  of  research
hat  structures  the  DSM-5.  In  fact,  future  contributions  from
he  Research  Domain  Criteria  (RDoC),the  principles  of  which
re  directed  at  understanding  mental  disorders  as  cerebral
isorders,  dysfunctions  of  brain  circuitry  evaluable  by  the
nstruments  of  cognitive  neuroscience,  and  of  developing
he  biological  basis  for  symptoms,are  proposed  for  inclusion
Insel,  2013;  Insel  et  al.,  2010).
Needless  to  say,  the  DSM  is  not  a  psychopathology  text,
lthough,  as  it  is  a  Manual  that  has  to  guide  diagnosis
still  clinical),  treatment  and  research,  it  is  quite  relevant
o  underline  the  obvious:  that  the  biologicist  perspec-
ive  (Adam,  2013)  conditions  the  subject  of  study.  As  a
atter  of  fact,  we  could  starttalking  about  a  NeuroDSM,
iven  the  proliferation  of  the  preﬁx:  Neurodevelopmental
isorders,  Neurocognitive  disorders,  or  Functional  neu-
ological  symptom  disorder.  This  seems  to  minimize  or
iscard  any  contribution  of  psychological  research  from  the
tart.
In  view  of  the  evidence  accumulated  (Blashﬁeld  et  al.,
014),  in  addition  to  decreasing  the  unspeciﬁed  categories,
mong  the  DSM-5  goals  were  development  of  clusters  and
imensions  of  disorders.  Dimensionality  appears  in  some
isorder  spectra,  in  some  disorders  (scales  for  diagnos-
ic  criteria  of  intellectual  disability,  autism  spectrum  and
chizophrenia),  partially  in  others  (domains  are  deﬁned
n  neurocognitive  disorders,  but  the  structure  is  categor-
cal),  and  in  determining  severity  (not  in  all  diagnoses).
t  is  curious  in  this  sense  that  inspite  of  following  con-
ributions  from  neuroscience  and  genetics,  and  although
he  data  matchmuch  wider  sets  of  disorders  depending  on
heir  susceptibility  and  pathogenesis  (Craddock  &  Owen,
010;  Cross-Disorder  Group  of  the  Psychiatric  Genomics
onsortium,  2013),  in  reality  the  resulting  clusters  are  much
f
2
core  limited  (e.g.,  schizophrenia  spectrum,  but  separated
rom  bipolar  disorders  and  autism  spectrum).  And  even
ithin  the  schizophrenia  spectrum,  there  would  be  no  rea-
on  (by  genetic  criteria)  for  distinguishing  schizophreniform
isorder  from  schizophrenia,  and  by  the  way,  harmonizing
he  DSM-5  with  the  ICD-10.
It  is  not  a  matter  of  forcing  a  choice  between  categor-
cal  and  dimensional.  As  Wakeﬁeld  and  First  (2013)  point
ut,  numerous  dimensional  variables  end  up  generating  a
oint  of  inﬂection  (points  of  rarity)  based  on  which  cate-
ories  are  established.  Perhaps  the  most  difﬁcult  thing  to
ccept  is  that  mental  disorders  (or  that  all  of  them)  are  nat-
ral  classes  by  deﬁnition.  But  it  is  deﬁcient  in  that  decisions
re  made  in  favor  of  some  dimensions  and  not  others  which
re  also  backed  by  research  (e.g.,  related  to  personality),
r  that  do  not  develop  one  of  the  crucial  dimensions,  the
ne  establishing  the  level  of  distress  (Sandín,  2013).
One  of  the  questions  that  remain  under  discussion  about
he  diagnostic  classiﬁcations  and  their  lack  of  validity  has
o  do  with  the  deﬁnition  of  mental  disorder  itself.  Although
e  are  not  going  to  concentrate  our  analysis  on  this  point,
t  is  advisable  to  remember  that  to  a  large  extent,  diagnos-
ic  decisions  do  not  depend  so  much  on  speciﬁc  symptoms
None  pathognomonic)  (Malhi,  2013),  and  do  on  clinically
igniﬁcant  distress  and  impairment  in  areas  of  functioning.
o  the  doubt  arises  of  whether  what  makes  a  person  suf-
er  is  a  mental  disorder  (this  is  where  the  issue  related
o  bereavement  arises),  or  whether  it  is  a  matter  of  pro-
esses  and  variations  not  coinciding  with  social  demands  and
ersonal  opportunities  (e.g.,  Circadian  rhythm  sleep-wake
isorders)  (Wakeﬁeld,  2013).  In  this  sense,  the  need  of  ﬁnd-
ng  the  precise  point  at  which  distress  and  signiﬁcant  clinical
eterioration  become  unmanageable  or  disabling  (Bolton,
013)  has  been  noted.  Therefore,  the  new  edition  of  the
SM  has  lost  a  perfect  occasion  for  an  indispensable  dimen-
ion.
A  ﬁrst  analysis  of  this  work  shows  that  the  number  of
eneral  diagnostic  classes  of  mental  disorders  has  increased
o  21,  when  in  the  DSM-IV  there  were  16  (excluding  the
hapter  on  Other  conditions  that  may  be  a  focus  of  clinical
ttention).  This  increase  in  diagnostic  classes  seems  right
n  some  cases  of  disorders  that  have  little  to  do  with  each
ther  (e.g.,  paraphilic  disorder  and  sexual  dysfunctions)  or
n  cases  like  the  Obsessive-compulsive  disorder  and  related
isorders,  takenout  of  the  Anxiety  disorders.
Apart  from  this,  an  apparently  minor  question  like  the
umber  of  diagnoses  in  each  DSM  edition  mismatch  in  dif-
erent  analyses  (Blashﬁeld  et  al.,  2014;  Mayes  &  Horwitz,
005;  Sandín,  2013;  Spitzer,  2001),  as  it  depends  on  what
ategories  are  included:  with  description  and  criteria,  forms
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order  could  decrease,  since  in  both  Obsessive-compulsive
disorder  and  Corporal  dysmorphic  disorder,  psychotic  sever-From  DSM-IV-TR  to  DSM-5:  Analysis  of  some  changes  
with  another  speciﬁcation  or  unspeciﬁed,  with  diagnostic
codes,  with  speciﬁcation  of  severity,  etc.  In  any  case,  to  the
contrary  of  what  is  often  published,  the  number  of  diagnoses
(with  criteria)  is  slightly  lower.
The  new  DSM  diagnostic  classiﬁcation  proposes  a  scheme
of  diagnostic  classes  placed  by  afﬁnity  of  their  character-
istics,  and  with  evolutionary  criteria,  from  manifestations
that  seem  to  originate  in  neurodevelopment  to  neurocog-
nitive  disorders.  In  each  class,  the  diagnostics  follow  a
chronological  criterion:  whetherthey  appear  in  childhood
and  adolescence  or  in  adulthood.  Some  of  the  major  DSM-5
diagnostic  classes  are  analyzed  below.
Neurodevelopmental disorders
It  should  be  emphasized  that  of  the  neurodevelopmental  dis-
orders,  the  mental  retardation  concept  must  be  replaced
by  Intellectual  disability  (intellectual  development  disor-
der).  Apart  from  eluding  the  derogatory  sense  of  the  ﬁrst
term,  the  concept  is  much  more  in  agreement  with  WHO
classiﬁcations  (such  as  the  International  Classiﬁcation  of
Functioning,  Disability  and  Health) (APA,  2013c).Included
in  Communication  disorders  are  Language  disorder,  Speech
sound  disorder,  Childhood-onset  ﬂuency  disorder  (stutter-
ing),  and  Social  (pragmatic)  communication  disorder  (and
being  able  to  distinguish  it  as  such  from  the  autism  spec-
trum).
The  Autism  spectrum  disorder  is  a  reclustering  of  DSM-
IV-TR  manifestations  headed  by  the  concept  of  Pervasive
developmental  disorders:  Autistic  disorder  (autism),  Rett’s
disorder,  childhood  disintegrative  disorder,  Asperger’s  dis-
order,  and  pervasive  developmental  disorder  not  otherwise
speciﬁed.  Two  major  domains  are  indicated  for  diagnosis
(formerly  divided  into  three):  Social  communication  and
social  interaction,  and  restricted,  repetitive  patterns  of
behavior,  interests,  or  activities.  The  genetic  risk  study  has
not  enabledcategories  to  be  discriminated  (King,  Navot,
Bernier,  &  Webb,  2014),  and  it  has  been  suggested  that  the
new  classiﬁcation  gains  in  speciﬁcity  but  not  in  sensitivity
(Volkmar  &  McPartland,  2014).
With  respect  to  Attention-Deﬁcit/Hyperactivity  Disorder
(ADHD),  it  has  been  questioned  whether  the  DSM-5  maintains
the  same  systematic  indicators  without  improving  precision
of  the  disability  (reduces  the  number  of  symptoms  neces-
sary  in  adults),  which  it  is  suspected  will  increase  false
positives  (Frances,  2010).  In  fact,  in  Criteria  B  and  C,  the
presence  of  impairment  or  distress  is  unnecessary  and  only
Criterion  D  alludes  to  them  generically,  so  overdiagnosisis
possible  (Epstein  &  Loren,  2013).  Furthermore,  the  neu-
roimaging  study  does  not  make  it  clear  whether  what  is
observed  is  rather  extremes  of  normality  (Shah  &  Morton,
2013).
While  there  are  no  relevant  changes  in  the  category
that  clusters  Speciﬁc  learning  disorders  (reading,  written
expression  and  mathematics  disorders),  several  disorders
that  were  scattered  in  the  DSM-IV-TR,  such  as  motor  dis-
orders,  have  beenreclustered:  Developmental  coordination
disorder,  stereotypic  movement  disorder,  and  the  various
categories  referring  to  tic  disorders  (mainly  Tourette’s  dis-
order,  persistent  (chronic)  motor  or  vocal  tic  disorder,
temporary  tic  disorder).
i
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chizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic
isorders
his  chapter  concentrates  a  series  of  relevant  changes.  On
ne  hand,  research  has  shown  a  more  uniform  view  of  this
iagnostic  class,  qualifying  it  in  this  sense  as  a spectrum
Garety  &  Freeman,  2013),  including  Schizotypal  personality
isorder.
In  schizophrenia,  as  already  claimed,  diagnostic  sub-
ypes  (catatonic,  disorganized,  paranoid,  undifferentiated
nd  residual  types)  had  to  be  eliminated  due  to  limited
iagnostic  stability,  low  reliability,  and  poor  validity  (APA,
013c).  The  relevance  given  in  diagnostic  criteria  to  Schnei-
erian  ﬁrst-rank  symptoms  and  the  consideration  of  bizarre
elusions,  traditionally  linked  to  schizophrenia,  has  dis-
ppeared,  thereby  gaining  in  speciﬁcity  (Keshavan,  2013).
here  are  no  changes  in  the  consideration  of  the  minimum
f  indicators  for  Criterion  A  (at  least  two  symptoms),  but  it  is
mphasized  that  at  least  one  has  to  be  a positive  symptom:
allucinations,  delusions,  and/or  disorganized  speech.
On  the  other  hand,  dimensions  are  included  in  the  diag-
osis  (Barch  et  al.,  2013).  In  the  previous  version  of  the  DSM,
 proposal  was  made  concentrating  on  the  three  dimensional
lusters  of  symptoms:  psychotic  (hallucinations/delusions),
isorganized,  and  negative  (deﬁcit)  dimensions.  The  idea
hen  was  to  improve  precision  in  identifying  schizophrenia
ubtypes.  The  current  proposal  concentrates  on  symptom
imensions  for  reporters  (or  the  patient  himself),  and  about
ymptom  severity  (Likert-type  scale  from  0-4)  (APA,  2013a)
other  scales  may  be  found  in  the  ofﬁcial  APA  website).  A
eparate  mention  should  be  made  of  the  scale  directed  at
he  patient  or  informant,  since  of  the  two  questions  about
sychotic  symptoms,  the  one  that  has  to  do  with  delusions
lludes  to  manifestations  typical  of  Schneider’s  ﬁrst  rank
ymptoms.  If,  as  mentioned,  these  symptoms  are  unspeciﬁc,
nd  no  instrument  is  dedicated  exclusively  to  schizophrenia
ut  to  psychosis  in  general,  there  are  doubts  that  it  would
e  a  useful  tool.
In  schizoaffective  disorder,  mood  is  made  preponderant
ver  disorder  duration  (including  prodromes  and  resid-
al  phase),  complying  with  Criterion  A  for  schizophrenia.
lthough  it  is  pointed  out  that  it  would  gain  in  reliability,  it
iminishes  the  frequency  of  its  diagnosis  (Malaspina  et  al.,
013).  What  would  have  to  be  asked  is  whether  the  diagnosis
f  schizophrenia  will  then  increase.
Concerning  delusional  disorder,  one  outstanding  point
tems  from  the  possibility  of  including  bizarre  content
n  delusions  (a  speciﬁcation).  This  question  is  on  target
onsidering  the  set  of  symptoms  that  accompanies  such
hought  content,  especially  if  there  is  no  deterioration
n  functioning,  nor  any  disorganized  or  bizarre  behavior.
ut  it  is  contradictory  if  the  reasons  given  for  exclusion
f  bizarreness  in  the  case  of  delusions  are  considered  in
chizophrenia.  It  would  be  sufﬁcient  to  mention  this  possi-
ility  for  both  diagnoses,  or  else,  indicate  it  in  the  detailed
escription  of  this  manifestation  and  not  as  a  speciﬁcation.
It  is  also  foreseeable  that  the  diagnosis  of  delusional  dis-ty  can  be  identiﬁed  without  requiring  a  double  diagnosis  (as
n  the  DSM-IV-TR).
2u
o
d
a
o
t
(
i
d
(
à
c
c
p
f
t
i
i
p
o
w
a
c
o
s
T
ﬁ
t
s
c
m
m
t
p
w
i
c
r
a
p
L
a
o
c
r
o
s
W
v
a
r
B
T
a
d
p
r
t
e
g
n
s
r
o
t
c
b
m
c
i
f
o
K
t
a
t
c
t
D
a
s
&
s
i
o
b
&
D
O
t
w
e
t
w
d
l
c
c
i
T
i
O
d
e
r24  
One  of  the  most  noteworthy  inclusions  in  the  DSM-5  Man-
al  is  the  separation  of  catatonia  from  the  speciﬁcations  of
ther  disorders.  It  is  clariﬁed  that  this  is  not  an  independent
iagnostic  class  (p.  119),  but  it  is  given  a  privileged  position,
s  it  is  identiﬁed  as  a  speciﬁer  with  the  codes  and  section
f  a  separate  disorder.  We  do  not  know  whether  this  reloca-
ion  responds  to  its  presence  being  as  high  as  stated  (10%)
Sienaert,  Dhossche,  &  Gazdag,  2013),  the  deﬁnitive  delim-
tation  of  its  etiology  (and  stimulus  for  development  of  new
rugs),  or  because  better  diagnostic  precision  is  required
Tandon  et  al.,  2013).
Shared  psychotic  disorder  loses  its  classic  name  of  Folie
 deux  and  is  relocated  as  the  latest  form  of  the  residual
ategory  of  Other  speciﬁed  schizophrenia  spectrum  and  psy-
hotic  disorders,  with  the  label  ‘‘Delusional  Symptoms  in  the
artner  of  an  individual  with  a  delusional  disorder’’.  Apart
rom  the  term  applied  to  this  disorder  not  being  very  opera-
ive  (think  of  the  clinician  making  his  report),  and  although
t  must  be  acknowledged  that  it  is  not  a  frequent  diagnosis,
t  remains  limited  to  cases  in  which  the  origin  comes  from
ersons  with  a  delusional  disorder.
Attenuated  psychosis  syndrome  has  been  the  subject
f  enormous  controversy.  It  is  cursorily  placed  within  the
ide  category  of  Other  speciﬁed  schizophrenia  spectrum
nd  psychotic  disorders.  The  arguments  that  support  this
oncentrate  on  its  diagnosis  being  situated  in  the  context
f  asking  for  help.  Most  of  these  persons  show  identiﬁable
ymptomology  of  anxiety,  depression  or  substance  abuse.
he  fact  that  help  is  requested  for  these  symptoms  justi-
es  their  being  treated  symptomatically  and  thereby  avoids
hese  persons  confronting  the  more  traumatic  diagnosis  of
chizophrenia  (Tsuang  et  al.,  2013).
The  heart  of  the  issue  with  respect  to  this  new  diagnostic
ategory  is  that  it  means  increasing  the  number  of  diagnoses
ade  without  absolute  certainty  of  what  the  consequences
ay  be  (e.g.,  stigma),  but  above  all,  because  there  is  no  cer-
ainty  that  antipsychotics  will  prevent  the  development  of
sychosis,  although  there  is  that  atypical  neuroleptics  favor
eight  gain  (Frances,  2010).
Emphasis  has  been  placed  on  the  signiﬁcant  probabil-
ty  of  transition  to  psychosis  (from  9  to  33%,  depending  on
riteria  and  time  lapse)  based  on  the  identiﬁcation  of  ‘‘high-
isk  mental  states’’  (high-risk  or  ultra-high-risk  criteria):
ttenuated  psychotic  symptoms;  brief  limited  intermittent
sychotic  symptoms,  and  trait-state  risk  factors  (Schultze-
utter,  Schimmelmann,  Ruhrmann,  &  Michel,  2013).  It  has
lso  been  highlighted  that  in  some  initiatives  the  presence
f  suicide  has  been  reduced,  although  there  is  no  proven
oncrete  treatment  (Carpenter  &  van  Os,  2011).
From  all  of  the  above,  it  is  understood  that  a  general
isk  syndrome  should  rather  be  discussed  (McGorry,  2010),
ne  of  the  possibilities  of  which  is  psychosis  (in  particular,
chizophrenia)  but  not  the  only  one  (Fusar-Poli,  Carpenter,
oods,  &  McGlashan,  2014;  Fusar-Poli,  Yung,  McGorry,  &
an  Os,  2014;  Van  Os,  2013).  So  it  is  a  premature  category,
nd  we  think  it  is  correctly  included  in  proposals  for  further
esearch.ipolar and related disorders
his  is  proposed  as  a  bipolar  spectrum.  Even  though  there
re  shared  speciﬁers  and  episodes  in  bipolar  and  depressive
(
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isorders,  in  addition  to  much  research  data  showing  the
roximity  of  the  two  diagnostic  groups,  they  appear  sepa-
atelyin  the  DSM-5.  In  the  DSM-IV-TR,  they  were  both  under
he  wide  Mood  Disorders  diagnostic  class.
From  the  viewpoint  of  the  description  of  hypomanic
pisodes  with  respect  to  Cyclothymic  disorder,  it  is  sug-
ested  that  numerous  periods  of  hypomanic  symptoms  do
ot  meet  the  criteria  of  a  hypomanic  episode  (or  depres-
ive).  This  was  not  expressly  stated  in  the  DSM-IV-TR  and
esolves  a  contradiction  present  in  bipolar  disorders  not
therwise  speciﬁed  (p.  401).  Among  thespeciﬁers  given,
he  most  novel  are  anxious  distress,  mixed  features,  mood-
ongruent  and  incongruent  psychotic  features.
In  the  DSM-IV-TR,  there  was  a  mixed  episode,  applica-
le  exclusively  to  bipolar  disorders.  The  importance  of  the
ixed  symptoms  speciﬁer  has  to  be  seen  in  its  historical
ontext  (not  exclusively  bipolar).  Classic  mixed  depression
s  observed  in  manifestations  of  early  onset,  with  heavier
amily  history  loading,  and  clearer  diagnosis  of  Bipolar  Dis-
rder  II  than  Major  Depressive  Disorder  (Benazzi,  2007).  The
raepelian  idea  is  that  recurrent  depression  is  in  reality  in
he  bipolar  sphere,  although  the  DSM-III  set  this  proposal
side  when  it  included  polarity  (Ghaemi,  2013).  Therefore,
he  mixed  symptom  speciﬁer  is  a  common  area  between  two
lasses,  which  from  this  perspective,  should  be  together.  If
his  is  coherent  with  this  starting  point,  the  error  in  the
SM-5  is  in  considering  that  the  symptoms  of  this  speciﬁer
re  euphoria,  impulsive  behavior  and  grandeur,  when  they
hould  really  be  irritability  or  reactivity  (Koukopoulos,  Sani,
Ghaemi,  2013).
One  question  that  has  been  brought  up  is  that  anon-
etspeciﬁer,  such  as  in  the  Persistent  depressive  disorder,
s  lacking.  This  is  especially  relevant,  since  about  a  third
f  the  severest  cases  (more  suicides,  psychotic  symptoms)
egin  before  18  years  of  age  with  wide  comorbidity  (Colom
 Vieta,  2009).
epressive disorders
ne  of  the  outstanding  changes  in  this  class  of  disorders  is
he  incorporation  of  the  speciﬁer  ‘‘with  anxious  distress’’,
hich  is  a  clear  acknowledgment  of  the  anxio-depressive
motional  combination  (and  perhaps  makes  up  for  the  deﬁni-
ive  withdrawal  of  the  mixed  anxiety  depressive  disorder,
hich  in  the  DSM-IV-TR  was  under  unspeciﬁed  anxiety  disor-
ers).
Disruptive  mood  dysregulation  disorder  is  described  to
imit  overdiagnosis  and  treatment  of  bipolar  disorder  in
hildren.  Severe,  non-episodic  irritability  is  the  organizing
ore  compared  to  typically  bipolar  euphoria  and  grandios-
ty  (and  also  brevity  and  recurrence;  Axelson  et  al.,  2011;
owbin,  Axelson,  Leibenluft,  &  Birmaher,  2013).  This  chronic
rritability  often  overlaps  with  ADHD,  and  up  to  85%  with
ppositional  deﬁant  disorder  (in  which  temper  outbursts  are
escribed,  but  the  opposite  is  much  less  coincident  (Axelson
t  al.,  2011).It  is  also  suggested  that  this  disorder  may
eally  be  an  acute  version  of  Oppositional  deﬁant  disorder
Dougherty  et  al.,  2014)  (in  Disruptive,  impulse-control,  and
onduct  disorders).
In  the  classic  category  of  Major  depressive  disorder
MDD),  the  differentiation  between  the  single  and  recurrent
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uFrom  DSM-IV-TR  to  DSM-5:  Analysis  of  some  changes  
episode  disappears.  It  is  based  on  the  premise  that  both
manifestations  were  etiologically  different,  with  different
vulnerabilities,  although  all  the  recurrent  forms  are  not  nec-
essarily  chronic.  Priority  is  given  to  course,  so  chronic  forms
of  MDD  (over  two  years  of  continuous  symptomatology)  and
Dysthymic  disorder  (DD)  are  integrated  in  the  new  Persis-
tent  depressive  disorder  (Dysthymia)  (PDD).  Regardless  of
its  already  having  been  known  that  most  of  those  who  met
the  diagnostic  criteria  for  DD  were  also  diagnosed  with  dou-
ble  depression  (MDD  plus  DD),  this  reorganization  brings  up
several  problems.  On  one  hand,  MDD  then  becomes  a  pro-
visional  diagnosis  (depending  on  whether  the  symptomology
becomes  chronic  or  not),  and  in  fact,  Criterion  D  does  not
exclude  PDD.  It  is  in  the  speciﬁcation  where  it  indicates
whether  to  treat  dysthymia  (pure  dysthymic  syndrome),  a
persistent  major  depressive  episode,  or  two  intermittent
types  depending  on  whether  the  major  depressive  episode
is  present  at  the  time  of  assessment.
On  the  other  hand,  DD  showed  favorable  coursein  the
DSM-IV-TR  in  up  to  50%  of  cases  (even  if  it  was  double
depression),  so  very  heterogeneous  conditions  have  been
assembled  under  the  sign  of  the  PDD  which  impedes  its  study
(Rhebergen  &  Graham,  2014).  To  summarize,  the  former
concept  of  dysthymia  has  little  time  left  (which  is  why  it
appears  in  parentheses),  and  the  point  on  which  this  new
disorder  turns  is  the  chronicity  of  the  depressive  manifesta-
tion,  which  is  why  all  the  speciﬁers  available,  most  of  which
are  inapplicable  to  pure  dysthymic  syndrome,  are  added.  So
do  we  then  deﬁnitely  reject  study  of  depressive  personality,
the  origin  of  DD?
Premenstrual  dysphoric  disorder  already  widens  the  ﬁrst
line  of  mental  disorders  (in  the  DSM-IV-TR,  it  was  among
the  unspeciﬁed  forms  and  research  criteria).  Arguments
have  been  made  against  its  inclusion,  in  the  sense  that  it
will  point  to  and  harm  women  and  that  it  is  a  manifes-
tation  fabricated  by  pharmaceutical  companies  (Hartlage,
Breaux,  &  Yonkers,  2014).  What  is  true  is  that  research
has  not  been  sufﬁciently  conclusive,  that  overvaluing  of
many  indicators  is  favored  (Gómez-Márquez,  García-García,
Benítez-Hernández,  Bernal-Escobar,  &  Rodríguez-Testal,
2007),  and  that  criteria  that  the  symptoms  appear  in  at
least  two  cycles,  but  not  consecutive,  will  increase  diagnosis
unnecessarily.
One  of  the  most  debated  questions  refers  to  bereave-
ment  and  possible  risk  of  overdiagnosis  in  what  has  been
called  medicalization  of  bereavement  (Frances,  2010).  The
DSM-IV-TR  was  clear  in  excluding  bereavement  from  major
depressive  episode  (Criterion  E).  There  was  a  possibility  that
a  diagnosis  of  MDD  was  indicated  if  the  symptoms  were
lasting  (persisting  for  longer  than  two  months)  and  espe-
cially,  with  aggravation  of  symptoms  (e.g.,  suicidal  ideation
or  marked  psychomotor  retardation)  (APA,  2000; p.  741).
More  so,  on  page  373,  it  was  suggested  that  MDD  could  take
place  starting  with  a  severe  psychosocial  stressor,  such  as
the  death  of  a  loved  one  or  divorce,  which  made  bereave-
ment  equivalent  to  other  stressors.  Therefore,  bereavement
is  not  a  disorder  and  is  diagnosed  when  the  symptomology
is  severe  and  characteristic  of  MDD.But  the  heart  of  the  problem  is  that  in  major  depressive
episode  the  DSM-5  does  not  specify  the  exclusion  of  bereave-
ment,  which  gives  us  to  understand  that  the  ﬁgures  for  MDD
identiﬁcation  will  increase  (Maj,  2013),  when  in  reality,  the
t
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ymptomology  comes  from  a  normal  reaction  of  bereave-
ent  (and  even  though  bereavement  is  expressly  excluded
n  the  deﬁnition  of  a  mental  disorder,  p.  20).
In  the  DSM-5  section  on  conditions  for  further  study,  crite-
ia  are  given  for  a  Persistent  complex  bereavement  disorder.
he  essence  of  this  proposal  stems  from  suffering  for  the
eath  of  someone  with  whom  he  or  she  had  a close  relation-
hip,  with  presence  of  clinically  signiﬁcant  symptomology
n  more  days  than  not,  and  which  persists  for  at  least  12
onths  in  adults  (and  at  least  six  months  in  children).  There
ould  therefore  be  some  continuity  from  the  DSM-IV-TR  (in
he  sense  of  dealing  with  a  diagnosable  condition),  length-
ning  the  time  span  (APA,  2013c).  Some  data  suggest  that
round  10%  of  bereavements  would  ﬁt  in  the  description  of  a
isorder  (violent  deaths,  or  traumatic,  such  as  the  death  of
 child)  (Bryant,  2013).  The  problem  comes  from  the  DSM-5
riteria  themselves:  Reactive  distress  to  the  death,  per-
istent  yearning/longing  for  the  deceased,  social/identity
isruption,  which  break  with  the  idea  of  the  previous  edition
f  the  DSM  and  pose  terms  of  doubtful  diagnostic  validity
ince  they  refer  rather  to  a  process  of  bereavement  that
an  be  lengthy,  but  not  pathological.
nxiety disorders
hildhood  characteristics  such  as  selective  mutism  or  sep-
ration  anxiety  disorder  are  studied  in  the  diagnostic  class
elated  to  Anxiety  disorders.  In  this  one,  it  is  clearly  speci-
ed  by  its  possible  presence  in  adults,  although  in  reality  the
SM-IV-TR  did  not  exclude  its  diagnosis  (p.  123).  Perhaps  the
imitation  of  the  previous  edition  is  that  it  forced  the  onset
o  be  before  18  years  of  age.  Research  shows  that  in  some
dults,  onset  is  later  (Bögels,  Knappe,  &  Clark,  2013).  In  view
f  this,  transitions  between  the  various  Anxiety  disorders  to
hich  it  can  lead,  as  well  as  its  relationship  with  Dependent
ersonality  disorder,  question  the  validity  of  this  category.
In  the  case  of  Speciﬁc  phobia,  and  given  the  changes  that
nclude  Illness  anxiety  disorder  in  another  of  the  diagnostic
lasses,  it  is  very  deﬁcient  in  that  there  are  no  explanations
bout  it,  e.g.,  in  differential  diagnosis  for  classic  nosopho-
ia.
The  classic  concept  of  Social  phobia  will  disappear  in
uture  classiﬁcations  due  to  the  term  used  in  the  literature,
ocial  anxiety  disorder,  with  the  speciﬁcation  of  whether
t  refers  exclusively  to  performance  anxiety  (talking  or
ddressing  a  group).
Panic  disorder  and  agoraphobia  remain  in  this  classiﬁca-
ion  as  independent  disorders.  Although  it  is  true  that  by
oing  this  it  is  desired  to  acknowledge  that  the  origin  of
goraphobia  is  not  always  panic,  it  is  no  less  true  that  now
here  will  be  two  frequent  comorbid  diagnoses.
In  general  terms,  the  role  of  panic  attacks  as  a  spec-
ﬁer,  in  reality  an  authentic  subsyndrome  present  in  all
sychopathology,  would  have  to  be  emphasized.  It  is  now
imited  to  two  forms:  expected  and  unexpected  (APA,  2013c)
instead  of  unexpected,  situationally  bound  (cued),  and  sit-
ationally  predisposed  in  the  DSM-IV-TR).Generally,  indicating  over  six  months  of  symptomology
o  avoid  overdiagnosis  in  Anxiety  disorders  may  be  an  ade-
uate  measure.  Precisely  because  of  it,  the  role  of  Limited
ymptom  attacks  (fewer  than  four  indicators  out  of  a  total
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f  13)  must  be  shown  in  the  forms  of  anxiety  with  another
peciﬁcation,  and  that  seems  to  stabilize  it  as  another  risk
yndrome.
bsessive-compulsive and related disorders
onsideration  of  manifestations  about  the  concept  of
bsession-compulsion  may  be  acknowledged  as  true.  It  is
ound  to  a  tradition  that  began  in  the  nineteen-nineties
Hollander,  1998;  Hollander,  Kim,  Braun,  Simeon,  &  Zohar,
009;  Hollander  &  Rosen,  2000),  and  was  suggested  as  a
pectrum  that  spans  from  the  most  compulsive  to  impul-
ive.It  includes,e.g.,  impulse-control  disorders,  addictions,
ating  disorders,  and  hypochondria  (Abramowitz,  McKay,
 Taylor,  2007;  Phillips  et  al.,  2010).  This  diagnostic
lass,  half-way  between  anxiety  and  depressive  disor-
ers,  is  now  made  up  of:  Obsessive-compulsive  disorder
OCD),  Body  dysmorphic  disorder  (BDD),  Hoarding  disorder
HD),  Trichotillomania  (which  announces  the  following  term
roposal:  hair-pulling  disorder),  Excoriation  disorder  (skin-
icking),  and  so  forth  (e.g.,Obsessional  jealousy).
The  speciﬁcation  insight  (good  or  fair  insight,  poor
nsight,  and  absent  insight/delusional  beliefs)  is  introduced
or  OCD,  BDD  and  HD.  In  BDD  in  particular,  it  was  observed
hat  there  were  few  differences  among  cases  with  or  with-
ut  delusions,  and  identical  response  to  drugs,  so  it  was
referable  to  specify  insight  than  give  an  additional  diag-
osis  in  the  psychotic  spectrum  (Phillips,  Hart,  Simpson,  &
tein,  2014).  The  speciﬁcation  With  muscle  dysmorphia  is
lso  added  for  this  disorder,  and  those  who  show  objec-
ive  defects  in  appearance  are  placed  in  Other  speciﬁed
bsessive-compulsive  and  related  disorders.
On  the  other  hand,  manifestations  such  as  HD  have  been
iven  backing  (Mataix-Cols  et  al.,  2010),  and  nevertheless,  it
learly  overlaps  with  Obsessive-compulsive  personality  dis-
rder.The  text  points  out  that  both  diagnoses  are  possible,
lthough  HD  is  suggested  for  more  severe  cases.  Therefore,
nd  like  manifestations  qualiﬁed  as  body-focused  Repetitive
ehavior  disorder  (nail-biting,  lip-biting,  or  cheek  chew-
ng),  these  manifestations  may  not  have  sufﬁcient  entity  and
equire  more  research  to  determine  whether  they  should  be
onsidered  isolated  disorders.
rauma and  stressor-related disorders
or  quite  a  long  time  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  clas-
ic  posttraumatic  stress  and  adaptive  anxiety  disorders  be
eparated  because  of  their  different  pathological  mecha-
isms.  This  class  of  disorders  includes  Disinhibited  social
ngagement  disorder,  Posttraumatic  stress  disorder  (better
ifferentiation  of  key  symptoms  of  three  to  four  indi-
ators,  especially  for  emotional  response),  Acute  stress
isorder  (not  only  dissociative  symptoms  are  emphasized),
nd  Adjustment  disorders.  Forms  with  another  speciﬁcation
re  placed  in  persistent  complex  bereavement  disorder.
issociative disordersn  this  group  we  emphasize  the  inclusion  of  dissociative
ugue  as  a  speciﬁer  of  Dissociative  amnesia,  and  inclusion  of
he  concept  of  possession  among  the  criteria  for  Dissociative
d
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dentity  disorder.  Possession  was  already  contemplated  in
he  DSM-IV-TR  under  the  unspeciﬁed  forms  among  versions
f  the  Dissociative  trance  disorder  (Spiegel  et  al.,  2013),
ut  here  it  is  given  an  appropriate  place  in  the  deﬁnition  of
issociated  identity.
omatic symptom and related disorders
rofound  transformations  have  been  made  in  this  chapter.  It
ould  be  said  that  the  organizing  principle  has  been  changed
rom  somatization  to  the  main  reference  of  somatic  symp-
oms,  whether  medically  explained  or  not.  The  idea  is  that
f  it  is  medically  unexplained,  the  patient’s  experience  is
elegitimized  (Dimsdale  &  Levenson,  2013),  but  the  con-
equences  of  considering  anyone  with  at  least  one  physical
llness  asa  mental  disorder  may  not  be  the  best  idea  (Frances
 Nardo,  2013).
Reclustering  the  Somatization  disorder,  Undifferentiated
omatoform  disorder,  and  Pain  disorder  categories  makes
ense  because  of  the  complexity  of  the  criteria  necessary
or  the  ﬁrst  diagnosis,  and  lassitude  with  respect  to  the
econd,  affecting  validity  of  the  diagnostic  classiﬁcation.
owever,  this  clusteris  described  very  ambiguously  under
he  name  Somatic  symptom  disorder  (SSD):  At  least  one
omatic  symptom  that  is  distressing  or  results  in  signiﬁcant
isruption  of  daily  life,  with  excessive  thoughts,  feelings,  or
ehaviors  related  to  the  somatic  symptoms,  and  causing  dis-
roportionate  thoughts,  high  level  of  anxiety,  or  excessive
ime  devoted  to  these  symptoms  (p.  311).  It  is  an  imprecise
eﬁnition  from  including  any  somatic  symptom  to  referring
aguely  to  worry  and  anxiety.
Research  has  suggested  that  the  total  number  of  symp-
oms  is  more  relevant  than  whether  they  are  unexplained
r  not,  which  is  related  to  disability  and  overuse  of  health-
are  services  (Sharpe,  2013),  even  after  having  adjusted  the
motional  variables  and  with  extensive  samples  (Tomenson
t  al.,  2013).  The  importance  of  a  larger  number  of  indica-
ors  among  the  psychological  symptoms  supports  the  posture
f  the  DSM-5  (Voigt  et  al.,  2012;  Wollburg,  Voigt,  Braukhaus,
erzog,  &  Löwe,  2013).  However,  this  also  means  that
 poly  presentation  is  more  relevant  than  a monosymp-
omatic  one  (it  is  unlikely  that  many  symptoms  respond  to  a
eference  illness)  (Rief  &  Martin,  2014),  and  certain  more
etailed  processes  could  improve  the  diagnostic  pattern:
elective  attention  to  bodily  signals,  dysfunctional  cogni-
ions  as  catastrophizing  interpretations  of  bodily  signals,
ersistent  attribution,  excessive  health-care  use,  avoidance
nd  decreased  activity,  or  functional  impairment  (Löwe
t  al.,  2008).  No  examples  are  given  in  the  criteria,  so  it  is
asy  to  predict  that  diagnoses  in  this  category  will  increase.
Another  question  that  attracts  attention  is  the  express
ention  made  in  the  differential  diagnosis  of  SSD  in  which
t  is  stated  that  the  presence  of  somatic  symptoms  is  not  suf-
cient  to  make  this  diagnosis,  because  it  excludes  irritable
owel  syndrome  or  ﬁbromyalgia  (p.  314),  and  contradicto-
ily,  are  later  dealt  with  in  Other  conditions  that  may  be
 focus  of  clinical  attention,  such  as  manifestations  with  a
eﬁned  etiology.  Some  authors,  even  in  characterizing  SSD,
ave  suggested  the  presence  of  these  disorders,  as  well  as
hronic  fatigue  syndrome  or  the  forms  of  multiple  chemical
ensitivity  (Rief  &  Martin,  2014).
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Although  the  difference  between  SSD  and  Illness  anxiety
disorder  (IAD)  concentrates  on  the  presence  or  not  of  ill-
nesses  (Starcevic,  2013),  there  is  some  overlapping  among
symptoms  of  both  entities,  because  of  imprecision  in  cru-
cial  measurable  behavioral  and  cognitive  symptoms  (e.g.,
rumination)  (Rief  &  Martin,  2014).
Another  novelty  of  the  DSM-5  is  that  many  of  the  persons
diagnosed  with  classic  hypochondria  will  now  be  identi-
ﬁed  as  SSD  (APA,  2013b).  The  concept  of  hypochondria
has  been  withdrawn  because  in  addition  to  being  deroga-
tory,  it  could  condition  the  therapeutic  relationship.  In
the  concept  of  hypochondria  there  are  two  contents:  the
belief  in  an  unspeciﬁed  disease  (overvalued  idea,  even  delu-
sional),  and  fear  of  developing  the  disease  (Noyes,  Carney,  &
Langbehn,  2004).  Research  on  IAD  requires  that  what  is  con-
sidered  normal  functioning  be  well  deﬁned,  since  presence
of  hypochondria  from  2-13%  is  recorded  (Weck,  Richtberg,
&  Neng,  2014)  (5.72%  life  prevalence),  far  above  1%,  and
although  it  is  true  that  classic  hypochondria  was  infrequent
and  difﬁcult  to  diagnose  (Sunderland,  Newby,  &  Andrews,
2013),  is  it  not  like  diagnosing  overweight  instead  of  obesity?
In  a  medicalized  society  with  strong  concern  for  health,  are
we  not  going  to  ﬁnd  an  increase  in  persons  who  meet  the
diagnosis  for  IAD?
Medical  emphasis  is  obvious  in  the  Conversion  disorder
(Functional  neurological  symptom  disorder),  justiﬁed  by  a
lower  percentage  of  cases  in  which  a  neurological  etiol-
ogy  has  been  found.  The  question  of  whether  to  locate
conversion  among  the  dissociative  manifestations  (such  as
dissociative  sensorimotor  disorder  (Spiegel  et  al.,  2013) or
in  relation  to  somatic  symptoms,  where  paralysis  ﬁts  well,
but  seizures  worse,  goes  way  back.
Psychological  factors  affecting  other  medical  conditions
is  a  controversial  class.  They  wereconsidered  separately
from  Axis  I  disorders  as  a  complement  to  them  in  the
DSM-IV-TR.  Many  subjects  studied  by  health  psychology  are
thus  understood  as  a  mental  disorder,  e.g.,  the  relation-
ship  between  chronic  stress  and  hypertension  or  anxiety  and
asthma.  Functional  syndromes  such  as  migraine,  irritable
bowel  syndrome,  ﬁbromyalgia,  or  idiopathic  medical  symp-
toms,  such  as  pain,  fatigue  and  dizziness  are  also  located
here  (already  indicated  in  SSD,  p.  311).
Finally,  we  believe  it  is  appropriate  to  include  Facti-
tious  disorder  in  this  diagnostic  class  because  it  also  uses
the  body  and  illness  as  a  vehicle  for  communicating  dis-
tress.
Feeding and eating disorders
This  section  includes  Pica,  Rumination  disorder,  and
Avoidant/restrictive  food  intake  disorder.  The  last  needs  to
be  studied  further  to  clarify  its  relationship  with  anorexia
(may  precede  it)  and  conversion,  given  its  link  to  concepts
of  functional  dysphagia  and  globushystericus  (p.  319),  or  its
relationship  to  anxiety  (avoidance,  frequent  traumatic  ori-
gin,  comorbidity).In  fact,  the  same  possibility  of  diagnosis
is  given  in  the  description  of  phobias  without  explanation
in  the  differential.  Furthermore,  many  of  these  expressions
may  be  limited  and  not  require  intervention  (Attia  et  al.,
2013),  so  their  usefulness  is  not  seen,  but  risk  of  overdiag-
nosis  is.
(
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Adjustments  have  been  made  in  Anorexia  nervosa  (e.g.,
he  requirement  of  amenorrhea  has  been  withdrawn),  and
requency  of  binges  in  Bulimia  nervosa  and  Binge-eating  dis-
rder  (they  are  equivalent:  at  least  one  binge  per  week  for
hree  months  or  more)  (Call,  Walsh,  &  Attia,  2013).  Some
tudies  concentrating  on  eating  disorders  with  the  new  crite-
ia  back  the  modiﬁcations  made  (Stice,  Marti,  &  Rohde,
013),  even  a  slight  increase  in  binge  eating  (0.2%  in  men
nd  women)  (Hudson,  Coit,  Lalonde,  &  Pope,  2012).  It  has
een  proposed,  however,  that  overvaluing  shape  and  weight
e  included  in  this  disorder,  which  would  diminish  its  preva-
ence  (Grilo,  2013)  and  make  the  group  more  coherent.  It
ertainly  seems  strange  that  a  description  of  a  person  who
inge  eats,  does  not  compensate  for  it,  and  feels  ill,  and  is
either  anorexia  nor  bulimia.
ubstance-related and addictive disorders
n  this  diagnostic  class,  the  concept  of  dependence  has  been
ithdrawn,  because  it  is  derogatory,  and  abuse  because  it
s  not  very  reliable  (it  was  sufﬁcient  for  one  indicator  to
e  met)  (Regier,  Kuhl,  &  Kupfer,  2013).  Research  shows  that
lthough  the  Substance  use  disorder  has  no  natural  thresh-
ld,  it  agrees  with  the  version  in  the  DSM-IV-TR  (Hasin  et  al.,
013;  Peer  et  al.,  2013).  Inclusion  of  the  concept  of  craving
akes  it  possible  to  relate  it  to  DSM  and  ICD  classiﬁcations,
nd  the  set  of  changes  made  will  differentiate  compulsive
ehavior  in  seeking  a  substance  better  (Obiols,  2012).
Diagnosis  of  Gambling  disorder  is  transferred  from  the
hapter  on  impulse-control  disorders  to  the  present  diagno-
is  class  (same  brain  reward  system).Reference  is  made  to  a
ambling  disorder  (and  not  pathological  gambling  as  redun-
ant  and  stigmatizing),  and  Criterion  8  in  the  DSM-IV-TR
illegal  acts  such  as  forgery,  fraud,  theft,  etc.)  disappears.
iagnosis  goes  from  at  least  ﬁve  to  ten  indicators  to  at  least
our  to  nine.  It  is  suggested  that  although  this  modiﬁcation
ay  increase  prevalence  (or  else  the  DSM-IV-TR  underesti-
ated  it),  the  agreement  between  the  DSM-IV-TR  and  the
SM-5  is  over  99%  (Petry,  Blanco,  Jin,  &  Grant,  in  press).
eurocognitive disorders
he  incorporation  of  Minor  neurocognitive  disorders  (mNCD)
as  awakened  controversy.  It  should  be  recalled,  however,
hat  it  was  already  suggested  in  DSM-IV-TR,  both  in  Appendix
 (Criteria  and  axes  provided  for  further  study),  and  in  the
ection  on  cognitive  disorders  not  otherwise  speciﬁed  (mild
eurocognitive  disorder).  Inclusion  in  the  DSM-5  and  its  pre-
entation  along  with  Major  neurocognitive  disorder  MNCD
due  to  Alzheimer’s  disease,  frontotemporal,  with  Lewy  bod-
es,  etc.)  is  another  example  of  continuation.
The  problem  is  similar  to  the  attenuated  psychosis  syn-
rome  described  above,  since  it  is  oriented  by  data  on
ransition  rates,  in  this  case  toward  dementia  (from  6-10%
er  year  in  epidemiological  studies,  higher  in  clinical  sam-
les)  (Petersen  et  al.,  2009),  and  therefore,  mNCD  is  taken
s  a  prodrome  of  dementias  (mainly  Alzheimer’s  disease)
Gauthier  et  al.,  2006).  Other  data  show  that  heterogeneity
s  the  norm  and  that  transition  indicators  with  participants
rom  the  community  are  much  lower  (3%)  (Decarli,  2003;
authier  et  al.,  2006).  Therefore,  this  incorporation  in  the
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SM-5  favors  excessive  medicalization  (Frances,  2010)  and
onfusion  between  aging,  cognitive  deterioration  associated
ith  aging,  and  the  development  of  a  neurodegenerative
rocess.  Research  must  ﬁnd  a  way  to  make  a  precise  dis-
inction  between  decline  and  deterioration.  But  the  most
uestionable,  from  a  psychopathological  viewpoint  is  that  a
NCD  is  identiﬁed  without  any  functional  impairment,  with-
ut  any  interference  in  the  activities  of  daily  life  (Criterion
).  In  addition  to  its  arguable  validity  for  a  diagnostic  classi-
cation  of  mental  disorders,  what  personal,  social  and  even
egal  implications  does  this  have?
We  do  consider  appropriate  the  domains  proposed  for
he  study  of  NCD  (Complex  attention,  executive  function,
earning  and  memory,  expressive  and  receptive  language,
erceptual-motor,  social  cognition),  adoption  of  a  charac-
eristic  neuropsychological  language  (possible  or  probable
llness),  and  integration  of  the  classic  amnesic  disorder  in
CD.
ersonality disorders
he  chapter  on  personality  disorders  (PD)  is  mentioned  as
n  example  of  incorporation  of  dimensionality  in  the  DSM-
.  However,  this  novelty  has  become  a  step  taken  without
onviction,  a  sort  of  yes  but  no.  On  one  hand,  the  previ-
us  categorical  classiﬁcation  was  not  backed  by  research
neither  disorders  nor  their  clusters)  (Livesley,  2011;  Pull,
014;  Tyrer,  Crawford,  &  Mulder,  2011),  and  nevertheless,
heir  basic  criteria  remain  unchanged.  On  the  other  hand,
he  dimensional  contribution  appears  in  Section  III  of  the
anual  (among  the  emerging  measures  and  models),  so
t  is  complementary  and  probably  not  secondary  in  the
linic.
This  proposal  ﬁts  the  Big  Five  factor  model  (Krueger
 Markon,  2014),  and  the  Manual  includes  a  com-
lete  version,  another  summarized  for  adults,  and  one
or  informants  (APA,  2013d,  2013e,  2013f).  It  consists
f  ﬁve  domains:  negative  affectivity/emotional  stability,
etachment/extraversion,  antagonism/agreeableness,  dis-
nhibition/conscientiousness,  psychoticism/lucidity,  and  25
ersonality  trait  facets.  However,  some  components  ana-
yzed  do  not  show  acceptable  reliability  (see  in  Krueger,
erringer,  Markon,  Watson,  &  Skodol,  2012),  and  Widiger
2011)  criticizes  the  DSM-5  for  developing  an  own  dimen-
ional  system  when  others  had  already  been  established  and
onsolidated.  The  truth  is  that  this  discourages  its  use.
It  has  often  been  suggested  that  this  perspective  is  too
omplicated  for  daily  use  by  the  clinician  (First,  2011;
yrer  et  al.,  2011),  and  however,  doctors  often  analyze  the
esults  of  a  hemogram,  for  example,  considering  different
imensions  and  combinations.  The  psychometric  tradition  in
sychology  and  the  model  of  the  broad  factors  is  sufﬁciently
olid  to  be  able  to  understand  and  apply  a  model  similar  to
he  one  described.
Another  of  the  criticisms  refers  to  the  Manual  offering
haracterization  of  some  speciﬁc  PDs  (antisocial,  avoidant,
orderline,  narcissistic,  obsessive-compulsive,  and  schizoty-
al  disorders),  but  not  others  (they  did  not  have  sufﬁcient
acking).  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  hardly  mentioned  that
n  the  case  of  Antisocial  personality  disorder,  there  is  a
peciﬁcation  of  psychopathic  symptoms  (in  addition  to  its
o
(
e
sJ.  F.  Rodríguez-Testal  et  al.
eﬁnition),  which  could  contribute  to  making  the  differ-
nces  debated  for  so  long  about  the  antisocial  personality
oncept  more  precise.
inal comments
he  latest  edition  of  the  DSM  was  started  before  publica-
ion  of  the  TR  revision  of  the  DSM-IV.  It  has  been  a  very
ublicized,  elaborate  and  long-awaited  text  (ﬁrst  as  DSM-
 and  ﬁnally  as  DSM-5).  Since  then,  criticisms  have  been
aried,some  coincide  with  past  editions  (e.g.,  tendency  to
eiﬁcation  of  disorders  or  presence  of  marketing  by  the  phar-
acology  industry)  (Obiols,  2012;  Reed,  Anaya,  &  Evans,
012);  others  have  addressed  poorly  written  text  and  lack
f  clarity  in  some  criteria,  plus  the  signs  that  will  favor  an
ncrease  in  diagnoses  with  its  application:  the  requirements
or  meeting  some  diagnoses  are  lowered,  new  disorders
re  incorporated,  variants  of  normal  behavior  are  included,
mong  other  arguments  (Frances,  2010;  George  &  Regier,
013).
Doubtless,  what  exactly  a  risk  syndrome  is  and  how  it
hould  be  approached  will  have  to  be  well  explained,  since
t  could  derive  in  the  same  treatment  being  applied  for  a
isorder  as  its  risk  factor,  and  that  says  little  in  favor  of
ntervention  precision.  At  the  same  time,  it  would  require
n  education  to  discriminate  and  balance  prevention  and
tigma,  a  labor  that  compromises  the  science,  and  social
gents.  In  this  sense,  mention  has  been  made  before  of  the
ttenuated  psychosis  syndrome  (which  in  the  end  is  proposed
or  later  study)  and  the  mNCD.  But  there  are  other  exam-
les:  Suicidal  behavior  disorder  and  Nonsuicidal  self-injury
re  proposed  for  further  study.  The  ﬁrst  case  attracts  atten-
ion  in  that  it  is  considered  difﬁcult  to  observe  outside  of  the
ontext  of  other  disorders  (bipolar  disorders,  depressive,
tc.)  (p.  803).  In  the  second  case,  it  seems  that  the  great-
st  emphasis  is  on  differentiating  it  from  the  ﬁrst  (Butler
 Malone,  2013),  although  nothing  indicates  speciﬁc  treat-
ents  in  this  sense,  or  that  it  makes  sense  to  separate  it  from
isorders  such  as  borderline  personality  or  posttraumatic
tress.  In  fact,  much  of  the  content  of  the  DSM-5  does  not
esolvedoubts  about  whether  the  descriptions  contained  in
he  DSM-5  are  valid,  or  whether  or  not  the  Manual’s  reliabil-
ty  has  improved,  so  it  is  difﬁcult  to  take  this  classiﬁcation
s  a  guideline  for  treatment  (Timimi,  2014).
One  of  the  decisions  that  we  think  has  to  do  not  only
ith  its  validity,  but  with  the  clinical  usefulness  of  a  diag-
ostic  system,  is  the  elimination  of  the  multiaxial  system
n  the  DSM-5.  Regardless  of  comorbidity  between  Axes  I
nd  II,  in  the  daily  clinic,  the  information  from  different
ontents  is  necessary.  Although  it  is  true  that  a  disability
cale  is  included  (the  WHO  Disability  Assessment  Schedule,
ocated  in  Appendix  III),  there  is  no  express  reference  to
ts  application  in  diagnosis.  It  has  been  suggested  that
here  are  numerous  speciﬁers  present  throughout  the
lassiﬁcation  that  make  up  for  this  content  (Harris,  2014),
ut  neither  does  it  guarantee  it  nor  is  it  the  same.  It  is
lso  true  that,  as  in  earlier  editions,  the  content  includes
ther  conditions  that  may  be  a  focus  of  clinical  attention
e.g.,  relational  problems),  of  strong  relevance  along  with
verything  else  that  makes  up  Axis  IV  and  which  should
erve  the  clinician  to  contextualize  a  problem,  and  research
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FFrom  DSM-IV-TR  to  DSM-5:  Analysis  of  some  changes  
on  delimiting  participating  variables,  but  there  is  no  clear
pattern  combining  the  information.
It could  be  said,  as  a  closing  point,  that  this  version  of  the
DSM  does  not  make  anybody  happy.  For  some,  because  it  is
obvious  that  the  approach  goes  in  the  direction  of  biological
reductionism  (which  does  not  ﬁt  in  with  what  affects  human
beings),  while  for  others  the  DSM-5  stops  short,  as  it  would
require  a  larger  number  of  biological  markers,  physiological
risk  factors  and  genetic  results  to  determine  mental  illnesses
(Kupfer  &  Regier,  2011).
Although  we  have  not  reviewed  all  the  diagnostic  classes,
in  some,  there  are  details  of  interest  (such  as  in  Sexual  dys-
functions)  and  even  among  the  proposals  for  further  study
(such  as  the  Internet  gaming  disorder),  we  propose  some
points  that  should  be  taken  into  account  for  the  upcoming
electronic  version  of  the  DSM  (ver.  5.1,  now  being  spoken
of):
The  validity  of  the  diagnoses  and  their  clusters  needs
more  in-depth  study  (perhaps  decreasing  and  integrating
categories)  and  they  need  to  be  separated  them  from  the
variants  of  behavior.  Just  as  terms  are  changed  because
they  are  derogatory,  alternatives  for  action  that  minimize
the  stigma  associated  with  diagnoses  must  also  be  studied
and  generated  (Kapur,  Cooper,  O’Connor,  &  Hawton,  2013).
It  is  imperative  to  study  and  dimension  distress,  and  relate  it
to  the  characteristics  of  the  context  to  offer  a  more  integral
view  of  human  suffering.  If  one  of  the  goals  of  the  DSM-5  was
alignment  with  the  ICD-11  (Blashﬁeld  et  al.,  2014),  it  could
be  added  that  they  should  suggest  integrative  dimensional
forms  (Harkness,  Reynolds,  &  Lilienfeld,  2014)  from  other
spheres  of  knowledge.
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